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1. Introduction 
African trypanosomiasis is a devastating disease, both for humans and animals. It is in fact multiple diseases, 
involving various trypanosomes, protozoan parasites carried by multiple variants of the tsetse fly (Glossina 
spp.). It appears in different forms, is affected by different epidemiological and ecological processes, and so is 
difficult to pin down. One major consequence of this is that there has been, and remains, great controversy 
about how to control the disease, and what to focus on through what methods. This paper examines the 
politics of these science-policy controversies, and attempts to pick apart the different debates at play.   
Over the last hundred years there has been a massive effort to fight the fly and control the disease (Maudlin 
2006). Colonial authorities were horrified by the consequences of human trypanosomiasis, or sleeping sickness, 
and invested huge effort and resources in trying to tackle it. Around a quarter of the colonial research budget 
was focused on sleeping sickness control, either major treatment campaigns for people, or wider efforts to 
push back the fly belts (Rogers and Randolph 2002: 534). Today it is claimed that 50 million cattle are 
potentially at risk from animal trypanosomiasis, and that the economic losses of the disease amount to 
US$4.75 billion per year, suggesting there are massive gains to be made for development of control 
operations1. As the Secretariat Focal Point of Programme Against African Trypanosomosis (PAAT) put it, 'We 
don’t just want to fight tsetse; we want development, to support poverty alleviation. That’s our objective.'2 
However since the peak of colonial efforts, human African trypanosomiasis has slipped down the list of 
priorities. Today it is classified as a ‘neglected disease’, one that is underreported, poorly understood and not 
allocated significant global resources, and so of lower prestige than other current priorities in global health 
(Maudlin et al. 2009). That said, there is still plenty of action around trypanosomiasis control – global 
coordination groups, pan-African initiatives, national programmes and dedicated branches, commercial public-
private partnerships for drug and vaccine development, and research projects galore on facets of vector and 
parasite biology. This paper will explore some of the institutional politics behind trypanosomiasis and tsetse 
research and control, examining how power, prestige, funding and institutional politics create a heady, and 
highly conflictive, mix. 
Trypanosomiasis is an ideal candidate for what some have called a ‘One Health’ approach, especially given the 
interaction of human, animal and ecosystem health aspects (Coker et al. 2011; Zinsstag et al. 2011). The 
different fly vectors are highly dependent on particular habitats for their survival, therefore ecological and land 
use change has a major impact on fly populations and the associated disease risks. Equally the probabilities of 
infection by people and livestock are influenced by the presence and distribution of hosts, including wildlife, 
and so disease dynamics are equally affected by ecology, as well as the social, economic, and cultural habits of 
people and their livestock. It is a highly complex system with interacting environmental, human and animal 
health components, each operating in ways that are highly dynamic and uncertain. This makes designing 
interventions very difficult and open to controversy about what is the best approach. This paper examines the 
on-going, and long-running debates about vector and parasite control methods, tracing the histories and 
associate politics of each. 
At the root of the challenge is a debate about the nature of the problem. Is the tsetse fly the cause of 
underdevelopment – low productivity of agriculture without animal traction, sickness of animals and people – 
                                                          
1 http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/programmes/en/paat/disease.html 
2 Interview, Raffaele Mattioli, FAO, Rome (see also Hursey and Slingenbergh 1995; Mattioli et al. 2004). 
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meaning the challenge is to control (or ideally eliminate or eradicate) the fly, and so the disease, from an area 
(the larger the better) to avoid reinvasion? Or does underdevelopment – poor infrastructure, low market 
opportunities, sparse populations, limited cattle populations, small arable areas, large areas of un-cleared bush 
–  create the conditions for the fly, and with it the associated depredations of the disease?  
This rather fundamental quandary was posed most articulately by John Ford in his 1971 book, The Role of the 
Trypanosomiases in African Ecology. A Study of the Tsetse Fly Problem (Ford 1971). Ford was a brilliant, lateral-
thinking, big picture ecologist who was committed to a style of development in ways that many other colonial 
administrators were not. He argued that wider development was the answer to the tsetse problem, and that 
pre-colonial, indigenous systems were highly effective. He strongly objected to the Pax Britannica thesis, that 
peace brought by colonialism had improved development. Indeed he argues that the early colonial epidemics 
of trypanosomiasis were a direct result of changing ecological dynamics influenced by colonial conquest, as 
well as the patterns of recovery following the rinderpest pandemic. They were not the consequence of 
‘barbarism’ or lack of law and order needing to be controlled by ‘civilised’ colonial science and administration. 
He argued instead that colonial science, 'almost entirely overlooked the way considerable achievements of the 
indigenous peoples in overcoming the obstacle of trypanosomiasis to tame and exploit the natural ecosystem 
of tropical Africa by cultural and physiological adjustment both in themselves and their domestic animals' (Ford 
1971: 9).  
While some of Ford’s assumptions can be challenged today thanks to our access to sophisticated genetic 
profiling techniques and a better understanding of disease ecology, and aspects of his assessment of local 
practice were probably excessively romanticised, some of the more basic questions he posed are still deeply 
pertinent. In particular, his argument that disease, ecology, human practices and wider processes of 
development are deeply intertwined, and that narrowly focused efforts to eliminate the vector or parasite are 
doomed to failure. He argued that, 'the relief obtained by very heavy expenditure on tsetse control is only 
temporary' (p.490) and 'what ought to be avoided are all forms of mass treatment' (p.492). Echoing some 
contemporary controversies (see below), he argued that, 'a policy based on elimination is not a practical one' 
(p. 10).  Also, in his advocacy of a ‘systematic’ integrated approach based on ‘joint investigation’, he was in 
many ways an inspired forerunner of the One Health argument of today.  
For a number of reasons touched on below, Ford’s argument, while influencing many of the key Anglophone 
researchers and practitioners, however, did not gain wider purchase. As shown below, the focus remained 
firmly on narrow ‘techno-fix’ narratives centred on a set of control methods and the big picture was often lost. 
In part, as this paper goes on to show, this was due to the narrow control of the mainstream policy narratives 
by particular networks of professionals and policymakers. In 1971, Ford argued that, 'knowledge of tsetse 
borne infections in nature is largely confined to a dwindling group of ex colonial civil servants, who tend to look 
on each epidemic as a consequence of the too hasty granting of political freedom and the collapse of control 
services' (p.488). This framing of the problem and solution that he identified over 40 years ago had a huge 
influence on how policy and practice has unfolded since. 
This paper offers an overview of the competing arguments about tsetse and trypanosomiasis control, 
particularly focusing on the savannah tsetse species and Trypanosomiasis brucei rhodesiense, most common in 
East and Southern Africa. In particular, the paper focuses in on Zambia and Zimbabwe as case studies, although 
wider experiences from across Africa are drawn upon. The paper is based on a close reading of a range of 
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material, including archival documents, classic papers and books, and is complemented by a set of 20 
interviews with key actors in the complex drama that is tsetse and trypanosomiasis science and policy today.3 
                                                          
3 Interviews were carried out largely by Skype during June and July 2013, with a review process during October 2013. 
Informants were predominantly based in Europe, the US and international organisations, and thus represent those with 
power and influence over research agendas, policy and funding in global arenas. Follow-up work will explore more Africa 
perspectives, particularly in Zambia and Zimbabwe. Informants largely remain anonymised in the text that follows. Given 
the controversies, this allowed informants to speak more freely. 
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2. Institutional politics of trypanosomiasis control 
There has been a long history of tsetse and trypanosomiasis control in Africa (see Giblin 1990; Hoppe 2003; 
Jordan 1986; Kjekshus 1977; Matzke 1983). As long ago as 1860, Richard Burton had identified the problem and 
had plans to release insectivorous birds in tsetse infested areas to control fly populations (Ford 1971: 1). This 
was not the first ambitious, slightly far-fetched, and ultimately failed, attempt at control. The successors have 
been many and varied and will be discussed in the next section. First, however, it is worth placing the various 
control attempts within a brief assessment of the institutional politics of trypanosomiasis control. 
Trypanosomiasis and tsetse control became institutionalised in the colonial era. With livestock and wildlife 
populations recovering from the rinderpest pandemic that swept through Africa from its introduction into 
Eritrea in 1887, there was great concern that the economic benefits of colonialism were going to be 
undermined. There were strong positions adopted, reflecting the considerable resources invested by the 
colonial authorities. Very different traditions evolved in Francophone and Anglophone Africa. 'The British 
focused on tsetse and the French on medical issues. Both thought the other was stupid. But actually it made 
sense, as they were tackling different things,'4 explained one informant. 
This diversity in part reflects the assumed differences between T. brucei gambiense and T. b. rhodesiense, 
respectively in West and Central Africa and East and Southern Africa, and so matching French/Belgian and 
British colonial authorities. As one informant commented, 'Tryps is complicated. Different parasites, flies and 
environments, some zoonotic, some not. Not really one disease at all [...] It has created lots of researchers, as 
associated cliques. All are passionately involved, pushing a particular approach.'5 
T.b. gambiense, a chronic disease, was thought to be endemic, circulating particularly in humans and, 
separately, in livestock and not with intermediate wildlife hosts. The control strategy focused on detection, 
isolation and treatment of human populations, as well as compulsory prophylaxis.6 The drugs used to treat 
human trypanosomiasis  were heavily toxic, sometimes fatal, and the approach was brutal and demeaning. 
'They effectively imprisoned the infected person,' explained one informant.7 Protecting the health of the labour 
force in the new colonies was however paramount and reducing infections was seen as a major priority. In East 
and Southern Africa, responding to the more acute and zoonotic character of T.b.rhodesiense strains, with 
wildlife known to be an important host, the response was more focused on the vector and the fight against the 
fly, using a barrage of techniques from bush clearance to game elimination and later intensive spraying 
campaigns, mobilised thousands of staff and huge resources. 
The colonial state and tsetse and trypanosomiasis control were thus co-created  in terms of both discourse and 
practice (Giblin 1990; Hoppe 2003; Lyons 2002). Taming the wilderness, conquering the fly, pushing back 
disease, all provided the discursive frame for a modernisation rhetoric, centred on the economic potentials of 
                                                          
4 Interview, researcher, Edinburgh, 6 June 2013 
5 Interview, researcher, Cumbria, 6 June 2013 
6 Eugene Jamot’s approach in Cameroon was particularly celebrated at the time, see: 
http://www.asnom.org/oh/en/0541_trypanosomiase.php?PHPSESSID=ae629fb09017c051eba6ce41ae8fd119#f. Of course 
isolation was widely used in Europe as a means to control diseases such as tuberculosis, especially when transmission 
mechanisms were poorly understood. 
7 Interview, researcher, Germany, 24 June 2013 
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colonialism, such as mobilising labour for plantations in West Africa or creating large-scale settler agriculture in 
cleared land in East and Southern Africa. The East Africa Commission of 1925, for example, claimed that, 'The 
ravages of the tsetse fly are the greatest menace to the development of tropical Africa,' (quoted by Ford 1971: 
1). The practices of control that evolved reflected the top-down, technocratic approach of colonial states. 
Control measures required mobilising subservient labour forces in often highly dangerous ground spraying 
campaigns or instituting draconian containment and treatment regimes on labour forces with no opportunity 
to object. One informant observed, 'Under colonialism, you could tell people what to do – without masks, 
without gloves, in the sheer heat of the dry season. Who cared, because you could get the people. There were 
armies of people with knap-sacks on their backs. They were used as slaves [...] It was strict, top-down control.'8 
The scale, depth and organisation of such efforts were witness to the disciplining power and control of the 
colonial state, and the institutionalisation of tsetse control branches, often the prestige section of the 
agricultural ministry with the most resources and personnel, was reflective of the ambition. This created in turn 
professional cadres, and associated career trajectories, committed to such a control response, and the funding 
and operation of control branches was thus dependent on justifying a particular style of response. An 
international conference was held in 1907 in London to discuss control strategies by colonial authorities across 
Africa. This established a scientific community that become consolidated through further conferences in Paris 
(1928) and Brazzaville (1948). Subsequently the International Scientific Committee for Trypanosomiasis 
Research (ISCTR) was established, which became the basis for extensive exchanges from 1949 onwards (Bourn 
et al. 2001; Duggan 1970).  
Such scientific networks were intimately linked to political power. As one informant commented, 'The colonial 
powers profiled themselves as credible fighters of the tsetse fly. You could show your status as a good colonial 
power by the effectiveness of your control efforts.'9 This colonial legacy, different across countries of course 
but with important parallels, is important to recall if we want to understand the contemporary institutional 
politics of tsetse and trypanosomiasis control, as it set the pattern of tsetse and trypanosomiasis control as a 
form of colonial governmentality – the power and practices of the state – firmly in place, and has created 
associated expectations ever since. 
While control measures have changed, and with them styles of intervention, the importance of tsetse and 
trypanosomiasis, especially for veterinary departments, is still significant.  The justificatory narratives that 
attempt to mobilise resources – if not to return to the glory days of the colonial era, at least to sustain a 
commitment to control – are important. Informants identified a number of justifications. 'The selling basis? It 
has to be it kills people. Fly bites man, man dies, we should do something.'10 The role of funders is clearly 
important. 'Donors want a success story,'11 'You get a problem, you move in, you strike, you move out. It’s so 
appealing.'12 Success stories are especially significant, 'The key is generating success stories. Everyone wants to 
be part of a success. Then donors will want to be involved. And governments. Research is needed to 
demonstrate tangible successes.'13 
                                                          
8 Interview, researcher, Germany, 24 June 2013 
9 Interview, researcher, Germany, 24 June 2013 
10 Interview, researcher, Edinburgh, 21 June 2013 
11 Interview, UN official, Rome, 20 June 2013 
12 Interview, researcher, Germany, 24 June 2013 
13 Interview, researcher, Vienna, 10 July 2013  
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The standard narratives start with the argument about the potential loss of cattle in tsetse infested areas. In 
turn this is translated into economic losses, or potentials of gain for development, if tsetse control is affected. 
The basis of the figures is always somewhat obscure. As someone put it, 'if that many die from tryps, it doesn’t 
leave many deaths to be allocated to tick borne diseases, lorry drivers, grazing shortages etc!'14 Of course there 
are all sorts of reasons why animals do not die in the numbers suggested, ranging from management practices, 
to changing habitat, to differences in fly species’ infection capacities, to resistance of local breeds, but it is of 
course the headline figure that remains important. Today such statements are offered by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), the African Union (AU) and numerous researchers looking for funds, sometimes 
elaborated in the form of models (cf. Kristjanson et al. 1999; Swallow 1997). The same arguments were used in 
the colonial era, and justified the interventions then.  
Similar arguments are made about the human impacts of sleeping sickness (Simarro et al. 2011a; Simarro et al. 
2008; WHO 2012). The World Health Organization (WHO) and the FAO invest considerable resources in the 
construction of a Human African Trypanosomiasis (HAT) Atlas15 that shows the distribution of disease incidence 
(Cecchi et al. 2009; Simarro et al. 2010, 2011b, 2012), while public health economists translate impact data into 
Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALY) calculations that offer estimates of the overall effect of the disease as part 
of ‘burden of disease’ studies.16 That sleeping sickness comes out rather lower than many ‘competitor’ 
diseases17 is down to what some have called the ‘tyranny of DALYs’,18 because, as the preferred measures of 
impact, they do not account for underreporting, or indeed the devastating impact of occasional epidemics. As a 
focal disease, impacts can be very concentrated with huge effects in a particular area (cf. Fèvre et al. 2008; 
Lutumba et al. 2005). There is also the fear factor with human disease epidemic potential. As someone put it, 
'There are lots of politics involved because of the fear [...] Sleeping sickness comes out of nowhere. It is a 
frightening disease.'19 
Thus there remains much uncertainty about the distribution, impact and importance of human and animal 
trypanosomiasis, and so the justificatory narratives often stretch the available facts to the limits. As someone 
put it, 'you can justify anything with estimates of the probability of success multiplied by the benefits, 
especially if you don’t discount! Research prioritisation is fraught with difficulties.'20 The same applies with 
distribution estimates and models of infection and their economic impacts (cf. McDermott and Coleman 2001), 
as there are just so many variables, with complex, non-linear dynamics, at play. This puts the tsetse and 
trypanosomiasis research and control community at a disadvantage. Funds have to be competed for in a 
shrinking pool, especially after the squeeze of structural adjustment that decimated tsetse control divisions 
along with the wider government infrastructure in Africa.  Advocates for the ‘big three’ – tuberculosis, malaria 
and HIV/AIDS – have made their case effectively and volubly, and trypanosomiasis as an African disease – a 
disease of the poor at the margins living in far-away places – cannot compete with the likes of avian or ‘swine’ 
                                                          
14 Interview, consultant, UK, 6 June 3013 
15 See: http://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/about/en/index.html; 
http://www.who.int/trypanosomiasis_african/country/risk_AFRO/en/index.html  
16 http://www.healthmetricsandevaluation.org/search-gbd-data?s=trypanosomiasis  
17 World Health Organization (2003) Global Burden of Disease (GBD) 2000: 
version 3 estimates. Available: http://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_ 
disease/estimates_regional_2000_v3/en/index.html  
18 (Simarro et al. 2011) also email interview, UN official, Geneva, 9 July 2013  
19 Interview, researcher, Edinburgh, 6 June 2013 
20 Interview, CG director, Washington DC 
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influenza, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and other high profile zoonoses that might have a big 
impact in rich countries in the West. While a few tourists and the odd western hunter may get affected, human 
sleeping sickness, and certainly animal trypanosomiasis, is just not on the political radar. As one informant put 
it, 'It’s not a global disease. It’s endemic, chronic and in Africa. It is neglected. It’s not FMD, avian 'flu or 
coronavirus. It doesn’t affect the developed countries. It cannot survive in those climates. It’s their problem – 
Africa’s problem.'21 Another commented, 'They throw billions of pounds at anything that might vaguely affect 
the West. Anything that causes panic. And they ignore the rest.'22 More bluntly, 'It’s exposing people in Africa. 
But it doesn’t matter because they are black.'23 Unlike in the colonial period, the rich West’s relationship with 
Africa is different today, black labour and white settlers do not need to be protected in the same way. Today 
the justification must be in terms of improving livestock production, and so livelihoods, as a contribution to 
sustainable development and poverty reduction.  
This does not mean that since the end of colonialism, tsetse and trypanosomiasis control has disappeared. Far 
from it. Millions have been spent, and a whole industry of research activity has continued. Although, as I will 
show below, this community is riven with factions and disputes, they all agree that their work is important and 
that more priority needs to be given to what has now been labelled a ‘neglected’ disease in need of more 
attention.24 
Who then are some of the key players? What are some of the institutional politics that drive their engagement 
in this area? In later sections of this paper the way some of these actors interact around particular vector 
control or disease management solutions is discussed, here I concentrate on offering a short profile of some of 
the regional and international players that have shaped the debate over the past decades. 
The international research system through the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 
(CGIAR) has had a long interest in livestock trypanosomiasis. The International Laboratory for Research on 
Animal Diseases (ILRAD) for example, spent the best part of 30 years working on a vaccine, while the 
International Livestock Centre for Africa (ILCA) worked intensively on trypanotolerant breeding from the 1980s. 
When ILRAD and ILCA were incorporated into the new Centre, the International Livestock Research Institute 
(ILRI), in 1994 some of this work continued, although the vaccine work came to an end in the early 2000s (see 
below). In this period a number of UK universities (notably Edinburgh) and research institutes (particularly the 
Natural Resources Institute) became heavily involved in tsetse/trypanosomiasis research, funded by the UK aid 
programme in large part, often with strong links to the CGIAR, and firmly part of the international research 
network. 
The approaches used were very much in the spirit of the CGIAR system, working on technical solutions to 
trenchant problems. The internationally funded CG system was established following the Asian Green 
Revolution, aiming to produce global public goods around key agricultural challenges. ILRAD and ILCA had an 
Africa focus and disease issues in livestock were seen as important, and with this being the only area of work 
across the CGIAR on livestock, it attracted top scientists, including those associated with the veterinary 
community who had been involved in earlier colonial efforts. Today, trypanosomiasis work in ILRI is not a major 
priority, and the technical research work around vaccines in particular has passed on to new players, such as 
GALVmed who are attempting to develop new products through brokering alliances between university based 
                                                          
21 Interview, UN official, Rome, 20 June 2013 
22 Interview, researcher, Edinburgh, 6 June 2013 
23 Interview, researcher, Edinburgh, 21 June 2013 
24 http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2010/9789241564090_eng.pdf 
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research departments and private sector drug and vaccine manufacturers, heavily funded by the new 
philanthropic funders, notably the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, as well as traditional donors, such as the 
United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID). 
Beyond the international research system, large regional projects have been the focus for both research and 
implementation activity that have shaped the field significantly, often taking on a regional flavour. The Regional 
Tsetse and Trypanosomiasis Control Programme (RTTCP) operated in southern Africa (Malawi, Mozambique, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe) from 1986 to 1998,25 and was supported by the European Union with significant funds, 
with complementary funds for tsetse control coming from the UK government, among others. This provided a 
lifeline to the veterinary departments of the region whose budgets were being savaged by economic 
restructuring. The RTTCP fitted a number of political objectives too, and this shaped its focus. First, it was an 
opportunity to support the newly independent Zimbabwe, and to capitalise on the very considerable research 
and operational expertise developed there. The end of the Zimbabwean liberation war meant that there was 
an opportunity to invest in control measures linked to a process of re-establishing national control and the 
demining of borders. Second, a grand mission to push the fly belt back over an area of over 300,000km2 was a 
sellable proposition. The key person in Brussels at the time had two big projects, the Pan African Rinderpest 
Campaign (PARC) succeeded by the Pan-African Programme for the Control of Epizootics (PACE) and RTTCP. 
Both provided ample opportunity to sell a big eradication story to the politicians and bureaucrats, and so 
mobilise funds to sustain the network of veterinarians, epidemiologists, entomologists and others linked to the 
tsetse and tryps community, both in Europe and Africa. It was a large aid commitment and, with hindsight, 
some have questioned its focus, 'That many euros! What were they thinking? They were just chasing the fly.'26 
As discussed at some length below, the RTTCP became a platform for the rolling out at large scale the odour 
bait trap technology developed in pre-Independence Zimbabwe and presented as an alternative to aerial 
spraying. It was thus presented as a pro-development operation (creating economic opportunities in the then 
‘front line states’), with technologies that were environmentally sound, cheap and efficient. As a flagship 
programme it had enormous influence on the policy debate, and the associated institutional politics in the 
region and beyond, even if the impacts on the ground were rather more modest. 
During the late 1980s and into the 1990s, as the odour bait technology became more widely popular, a key 
challenge was how to sustain the operations and stop communities destroying the traps. The International 
Centre on Insect Physiology and Ecology (ICIPE,) based in Nairobi, but outside the well-funded CGIAR network 
and often seen as an outsider, championed a community approach. ICIPE has also been involved in technology 
development, including, as discussed below, insect repellent collars, for use on livestock27.  
From the 1980s, and coming from a completely different angle, the International Atomic Energy Authority 
(IAEA) entered the scene (Lundquist 1987).28 The IAEA, based in Vienna, has a UN mandate and promotes the 
‘peaceful use of nuclear power.’29 It has strong backing from the United States, and in its entomology work, 
using the sterile male insect technique with mass-irradiated flies released,30  built on successes in the Americas 
                                                          
25  http://www.sacema.com/uploads/tsetse/tsetse-project/tsetse-project-final-report-summary.pdf 
26 Interview, researcher, Germany, 24 June 2013 
27 http://aasw6.wordpress.com/2013/07/18/kill-the-killer-fly/; see also: http://www.icipe.org/index.php/animal-
health/307-validation-and-initiation-of-diffusion-of-pro-poor-and-poor-environment-tsetse-repellent-technology.html  
28 Early IAEA work on trypanosomiasis had focused on diagnostic testing. 
29 See ‘Atoms for Food’, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/Fao/fao0910.pdf 
30 http://www-naweb.iaea.org/nafa/ipc/sterile-insect-technique.html 
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with screw worm. Area based eradication is the mantra, and a particular approach is at its centre. This 
relatively well funded operation, with a clear goal and technology focus, has had a major impact on the debate 
and created much controversy, and with this some fairly brutal institutional politics. Seen as a competitor to 
other approaches there has been sustained warfare between different control factions that has heavily 
influenced patterns of publishing, flows of funding, membership of advisory committees, and networks and 
alliances within the field. From the outside the conflicts look rather trivial, sometimes absurd, but from the 
inside, they are clearly very real, as discussed further below. 
A very particular influence of the IAEA and the SIT approach has been on the pan-African African Union (AU) 
vision of a complete eradication of the tsetse fly put forward as the overarching vision of the Pan African Tsetse 
and Trypanosomiasis Eradication Campaign (PATTEC) hosted by the AU. At the 36th summit of the then 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in Togo in 2000 heads of state resolved to ‘act collectively and rise to the 
challenge of eradicating tsetse flies from the African continent in the shortest time possible.’ John Kabayo, the 
then PATTEC Coordinator, articulated his vision in a paper in 2002 He argued for, 'the application of the area-
wide principle that is planned, and the goal to continue the interventions in each identified area until 
confirmation of local elimination of the tsetse populations.' (Kabayo 2002: 474) As one commentator recalled, 
'PATTEC provided a renewed spurt of interest. It was like Godzilla rising out of the ashes.'31 
This brought uproar from elsewhere in the tsetse and trypanosomiasis community (and by the tenor of some of 
my interviews still does). David Rogers and Sarah Randolph from Oxford University responded to the paper in 
scathing terms, 'PATTEC’s proposals ignore the lessons of history, deny certain undeniable ecological facts, 
require a degree of coordination that seems unlikely, and will surely lead to increasing foreign exchange debt 
with very little to show for it.' (Rogers and Randolph 2002: 534) In interviews, others observed, 'SIT was not 
technically feasible. It was not economically feasible either;'32 'It’s careers for people in well-funded labs.'33 
Since its launch, and the mobilisation of considerable loan funds by a number of countries from the African 
Development Bank, the PATTEC pitch has become more muted. Control or selected area based elimination are 
talked of, rather than eradication, and the wider ambitions of rural development are emphasised, rather than 
control seemingly for its own sake. Nevertheless, accusations still fly that PATTEC operations are ‘corrupt’, that 
funding ‘has no justification’, that projects are ‘a scandal’, that money is ‘wasted in vast amounts’, that ‘white 
elephants’ are being created and that the valuable pan-African vision is being ‘distorted’ and ‘manipulated’ by 
certain groups who have ‘captured’ the agenda. One scandalised commentator observed, 'It’s loan money. 
They took money from poor countries. They got Ethiopia to borrow the money to put into a massive white 
elephant.'34 Accusations of any wrong-doing remain unsubstantiated, but whether true or not, they are 
vehemently held by some, and this has resulted in an intensive, and often rather vitriolic, debate among 
different groups about the implications of these often very substantial investments. 
As someone put it, much of the story of trypanosomiasis control has been centred on the survival of veterinary 
departments, particular research efforts and professional careers. Someone argued, 'Those who are committed 
to a certain disease or control technique hate an honest appraisal. They want their disease to be the biggest 
and worst, and so in need of funding.'35 'They wanted to eradicate the fly...The idea was that this was the next 
                                                          
31 Interview, CGIAR researcher, Nairobi, 12 July 2013 
32 Interview, CGIAR director, Washington DC, 10 July 2013 
33 Interview, consultant, Triana, 19 June 2013 
34 Interview, researcher, Harare, 24 June 2013 
35 Interview, consultant, UK, June 2013  
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rinderpest. This was the cash line from the 1970s and 80s. Now they needed something else. Then came 
PATTEC, and of course avian influenza later on. Each one, the vet community needed to milk it for everything it 
was worth.'36 
Often enlisted as part of these debates are the core UN agencies with mandates in this area, the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) and WHO. The FAO has long had a coordinating role, with the establishment of 
Programme Against African Trypanosomosis (PAAT) in 1997.37 PAAT is an inter-agency alliance involving various 
players, including FAO, WHO, IAEA, AU-IBAR and others, and is chaired by Professor Ilemobade from Nigeria. 
FAO and PAAT provide support to the AU PATTEC initiative, and there have been efforts to harmonise efforts38. 
The PAAT Secretariat Focal Point at FAO emphasises the importance of providing technical data, information on 
regulation issues, and guidance to member states, as well as policy work in alignment with the African Union. 
This is standard UN fare, but underneath (as ever) there is hot politics, reflecting the disputes hinted at above. 
As a number of informants reflected, the tryps/tsetse ‘community’, despite the narrow focus of work, has been 
so fractured, and bitterly divided that joint work has been extremely challenging, certainly in the recent past, 
although reportedly things have improved of late. This seems more the case for animal trypanosomiasis and 
tsetse control where the turf wars over control techniques are extreme. On the human health side, WHO has 
clear focus on ways forward, at least as expressed in expert reports,39 and with greater resources, successfully 
mobilised from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, there is renewed emphasis on drug treatments for 
HAT.40 This is dominated more by the Francophone community, and those with West African expertise, 
reflecting the focus on T.b. gambiense noted earlier.  
There are of course many other players, including independent scientists based at universities, private 
pharmaceutical companies producing treatment and prophylactic drugs for both animals and humans, and 
national agencies – the health ministry, the veterinary department, the tsetse control unit – each with different 
perspectives, and angles. But most of these other players are also connected in different ways to the groupings 
above –  for funding, for professional connections – and so the networks that are formed reflect the wider fault 
lines and intense debates about what to do where and how.   
And of course there are those who are not part of the rather inward looking trypanosomiasis and tsetse 
community itself, including; the often poor and marginalised people living in disease-affected areas who hunt, 
gather and herd livestock in tsetse infested areas; environmentalists who have a particular view about the 
value of wilderness and the ravages that might result from tsetse clearance, and the movement of people and 
domestic animals into such areas; as well as those who make a lucrative living from selling wilderness, and its 
abundant wildlife, to tourists, trophy hunters and others but who also want to avoid sleeping sickness for their 
clients as well as workers. Each of these groupings, as the paper shows later, have different narratives about 
the problem and solution, challenging the mainstream ‘techno-fix’ narrative centred on different technological 
control techniques that dominates the debate. 
Just as in the colonial era, although now with a very different configuration of actors and interests, the 
institutional politics being played out reflects access to money, power, authority and prestige. While moving 
                                                          
36 Interview, CGIAR researcher, Nairobi, 10 July 2013 
37 http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/programmes/en/paat/home.html 
38 http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/programmes/en/paat/documents/tsetse_ag.pdf 
39 http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/79689/1/WHO_HTM_NTD_IDM_2013.4_eng.pdf 
40 http://www.who.int/trypanosomiasis_african/partners/gates/en/index.html 
 11 
 
down the priority list, resources are still there to be captured and many believe passionately that 
trypanosomiasis and tsetse work needs greater emphasis in international efforts. There is thus, as in any area, 
a particular political economy, embedded in institutions and networks of actors, that fosters a series of 
narratives that frame the debate. Some of these are more dominant than others, and there are many nuances 
and variations between them. Just as John Ford challenged the mainstream colonial view in the 1960s, there 
are some who dispute some of the claims of the dominant approaches today. And even if committed, say, to 
tsetse control, there are numerous ways of going about it, each with different combinations of technologies 
and practices, with strong advocates for each.  
A window on this, and so a perspective on the wider debate from a political economy of science and policy 
angle, is through the often intense competition over scientific ‘facts’ about disease and vector control and 
management, usually in the context of deep uncertainty, and how these are resolved, or not, within the expert 
community. Linked to this is the often rather vicious debate about the appropriateness or otherwise of 
different treatment and control technologies, and their costs and benefits (Shaw 2009). In the next section, 
focusing in particularly on East and Southern Africa, this paper offers a brief history of these varied efforts from 
the colonial era to the present, analysing the intersections of science, power and politics, and the way these 
have shaped intervention narratives, and so pathways of response over time. The end of the paper tries to 
make sense of these, and looks at why the very particular political economy of tsetse and trypanosomiasis 
control has limited the possibilities of a more joined-up ‘One Health’ approach.  
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3. A brief history of trypanosomiasis and tsetse control: science, 
power and politics 
Beyond the wider institutional politics we can read the contests of power and politics, and the associated 
narratives of disease control, through a more detailed reflection on the competing approaches to 
trypanosomiasis and tsetse control. As a window on the process by which science, politics and development 
are co-constructed it is revealing. For debates about which vector control or disease management options 
make sense reflect broader visions of what development is for, what landscapes should look like and how 
people and diseases are seen within them. This section, then, offers an overview of the various approaches 
proposed from the colonial era to the present. 
Colonial scorched earth policies 
Following the recovery of cattle and wildlife populations after their decimation by rinderpest, trypanosomiasis 
in both humans and animals became a major concern for colonial authorities. In southern Africa for example, 
tsetse fly infestations were hampering colonisation, especially the expansion of settler agriculture and large-
scale ranching. Colonial authorities ordered large scale bush clearance and wildlife extermination programmes. 
These were major efforts, involving armies of people, clearing bush with machetes and trapping and shooting 
wildlife. The scale was phenomenal. For example around 750,000 animals were shot in Zimbabwe between 
1932 and when the game destruction policy was stopped in 1961 (Ford 1971: 322). A close alliance between 
veterinary departments and hunters was struck as the bounty of wild Africa was systematically exterminated. 
Presented as a project of taming, conquering and transforming wilderness into a productive alternative, these 
efforts were very much coincident with the colonial effort, and were allocated substantial resources.  
They met with some success, especially where focal points of reinvasion following rinderpest existed. In 
Zimbabwe, for instance, the fly belts were pushed back significantly due to control efforts (Lovemore 1994).41 
The settler population backed these efforts as land became available and was cleared. Yet local people were 
not part of the picture, except as enlisted workers for the huge operations. The memories of these campaigns 
are often evoked, with strong nostalgia by some, 'It was a really massive effort. There were thousands of 
people, tens of trucks, dozers. If you lead the department you imagine that you can revive the department to 
that level of capacity. But it won’t happen.'42 
These approaches were not without their critics. While an environmentalist lobby did not exist as it does today, 
many white settlers and colonial officers had a romantic attachment to wilderness, wildlife and remote Africa, 
and so for these people the clearance policies were seen as unreasonably destructive.  
Even within the ranks of the veterinary establishment there were debates. Most vocal of course was John Ford 
mentioned earlier. One informant described him, 'He was a giant. He moved away from the crowd and climbed 
the summits. He could always look at the big picture.'43 As discussed earlier, he argued against the mass 
eradication campaigns and made the case that local, indigenous systems of disease management of the pre-
                                                          
41 http://www.sacema.com/uploads/tsetse/tsetse-project/tsetse-project-reprint-1387.pdf 
42 Interview, researcher, Warwick, 19 June 2013 
43 Interview, researcher, Germany, 24 June 2013 
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colonial period offered a more sustainable solution, complemented by less extreme forms of external 
intervention. Regular, but low, levels of challenge, he argued, fostered trypanosomiasis resistance among both 
cattle and people44 and when combined with vegetation management, settlement site choice and herding 
behaviours, this offered a better route to a longer-term solution. This did not go down well with the more 
macho, scorched earth advocates in the colonial veterinary service, and his views were widely dismissed or 
ignored. In the end he was expelled from Rhodesia for his more moderate views, and returned to the UK to 
write his book. 
The chemical revolution 
Overlapping with this period was the promotion of insecticide applications, both from the air and through 
ground spraying operations. The chemical revolution accelerated following the Second World War when new 
chemicals, notably the organochlorines, DDT and dieldrin, became available thanks to the war effort. This was 
also a period when new settlers were arriving and the land allocated to white settlement began to be claimed 
in earnest. War veterans from the UK and elsewhere were offered land, often in the more marginal areas, and 
colonial authorities needed to expand ‘African’ land to accommodate them. Tsetse clearance thus became a 
greater imperative. As one informant explained:  
In the 50s and 60s tryps was a serious veterinary problem. In Zimbabwe they were looking to open up 
new places for communal areas. When the flies came back after rinderpest, it was a problem. The 
white famers of Matabeleland North put serious pressure on the government. 
[Interview, researcher, Pretoria, 20 June 2013] 
The ground spraying operations followed a similar pattern to the earlier bush clearance and wildlife 
extermination campaigns, and were often combined. Again vast numbers of people were mobilised, often in 
very unsafe working conditions, to spray huge areas.  
Air spraying was initiated in South Africa in the 1950s, especially in and around Kruger National Park, where a 
post-rinderpest focal point still existed. Huge quantities of toxic chemicals were dumped on the bush, mixed 
with the fuel and ejected from the exhausts of low flying aircraft. 'The amount of dieldrin they put on was 
extraordinary […] It was mixed with fuel and came out of the exhaust of the planes. It was in quantities that 
were unimaginable. They were so enthusiastic.'45 
Here again, this was presented as human mastery over nature, the deployment of technology to conquer a 
scourge that lay in the way of a colonial vision of modernisation. The military scale of the operations, and the 
involvement of former armed forces personnel as pilots, logistics operators and so on, gave a particular image 
and flavour to these efforts, reflected in turn in the language used – campaign, front, operation. This was the 
full force of colonial power being exerted, confronting and taming a dangerous and threatening Africa.  
Both the intensity and scale of these efforts did, again, have results, boosting the argument for a top-down, 
hierarchically organised, military style operation. For example, tsetse was eliminated from the Kruger area, and 
the area has remained clear to this day. In other areas the fly belts were pushed back into the valleys and off 
the more productive farm and ranch lands. But it all came at a cost: in terms of human health and well-being 
                                                          
44 The idea that ‘healthy carriers’ of human trypanosomiasis explained the relatively low incidence among the local 
population in the Zambezi valley, for example, had been a subject of discussion over many years (see Ford 1971: 358-66) 
45 Interview, researcher, Germany, 24 June 2013 
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(for ground spraying operators with backpacks of chemicals); the risk of death (for pilots flying in low in difficult 
country); and for the environment (in terms of the impact of residual chemicals).  
Colonial authorities were not well known for their concerns for work health and safety for their black workers, 
but when a white pilot died in Zambia in the 1980s, this put a stop to low level air spraying under the RTTCP. 
However it was the rising environmental concern with the use of organochlorines that had the greatest impact. 
Rachel Carson’s book, Silent Spring, published in 1962, raised the consciousness of a nascent environmental 
movement (Carson 1962).  DDT in particular became a watchword for environmental destruction. 'There was 
quite heavy opposition to insecticide use. It was a hangover from Carson. Organocholorines had real concerns.. 
But the conservationists were mostly concerned about changing land use […] They objected to insecticides 
because they didn’t want the areas cleared.'46 Extensive studies, particularly in Zimbabwe, had shown the 
negative impacts of the use of residual chemicals as part of spraying campaigns (Douthwaite and Tingle 1994; 
SEMG 1997). But Grant (2001: 10) feared that the efforts of the African Union to exterminate the tsetse fly 
were likely to be stymied by unfounded concerns. 'We can contemplate a suffocation of implementation 
caused by environmental risk perception than by technical and economic issues,' he thought. 'There were 
negative impacts from all the chemical-based techniques – not just residual ones - it was a question of scale 
and acceptability of impacts.  The AU wanted to employ all the available techniques for their "eradication 
goal".'47 
Even though, over time, air spraying switched to endosulfans and other less toxic chemicals, such as synthetic 
pyrethroids, with lower residual effects, the image of aircraft releasing gallons of chemicals on the African bush 
was not good public relations. Ground spraying as well was seen as too expensive, dangerous and 
environmentally damaging, even if, again, the approaches to chemical application had become more and more 
selective and targeted. By the 1980s, ground spraying had become much more discriminatory and focused 
(although more expensive) and air spraying used a sequential aerosol drift technique (SAT) to reduce chemical 
impacts on wildlife.  
In Zimbabwe ground spraying with DDT continued until 1991, and in the Okavango delta of Botswana a major 
air spraying operation continued through the 80s and 90s using endosulfans. 'There were 17 successive years 
of spraying. It did not work. They couldn’t get enough of it. It went on and on. It was just madness. They could 
have done it for centuries.'48 commented one observer. Eventually the Botswana efforts had success thanks in 
particular to another technological development – the emergence of GPS systems for highly site specific 
spraying (Kgori et al. 2006). 'You could then do precision air spraying. They were able to wipe out morsitans in 
one dry season.'49 explained one informant. The Okavango too was a relatively easy place to navigate and 
therefore to spray accurately, being large and flat. The Botswana Government made it very clear to 
environmentalists that the aim was to remove the fly to protect tourists, not to allow encroachment of cattle 
and agriculture. Elsewhere it was more difficult, although air spraying operations still continue, with recent 
efforts in Ethiopia and Ghana for example. 
Spraying efforts today are limited, and subject to much more exercising of controls than in the past. 
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), toxicity appraisals and health and safety procedures are all part of 
the new requirements (Grant 2001). Today spraying operations are not part of large government led, military-
                                                          
46 Interview, consultant, UK, 24 June 2013 
47 Ian Grant (pers.comm., 7 October 2013) 
48 Interview, researcher, Germany, 24 June 2013 
49 Interview, researcher, Germany, 24 June 2013 
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style campaigns. The veterinary departments simply do not have the resources or expertise. Instead, private 
contractors have taken on the role, often crop spraying companies from southern Africa, with highly expert 
pilots. However, without the capacity to regulate operations, and with EIAs often being perfunctory exercises 
in box ticking, there are concerns about the impacts of such efforts.   
An alternative use of chemicals has evolved in parallel, however, particularly following the development of low 
toxicity pyrethroid compounds, and this involves application on animals. Insecticide treated cattle approaches 
can be highly effective against tsetse, particularly as the knowledge about fly behaviour has evolved (Hargrove 
et al. 2012; Hargrove et al. 2003; Torr et al. 2011; Torr et al. 2007). This means that pour-on application 
techniques can be highly targeted and managed by herders (Swallow et al. 1995). With the flies having such 
low reproductive rates, the kill rate needs only to be relatively low in order to have a major control effect. 
'Actually it’s quite simple. Look after your cattle, spray the front legs, perhaps once a month, even every three 
months. It might cost two cents to spray,'50 explained one researcher.  
Such approaches can involve individual farmers, as well as more systematic applications through livestock 
dipping systems. The approach can also be combined with tick control, thus making any investment much more 
cost-effective. Concerns have been raised though about resistance, and on-going research on this continues.  
A rather lower profile effort led by ICIPE involved the development of repellent collars. Rather than killing the 
flies, the idea was to repel them, and this involved fitting collars to the animals. This has involved research over 
a number of years, but the efficacy of the technology is disputed.51 The approach is still being promoted (see 
above), but has not seen much uptake. As a marginal player, without the funds or the scientific clout, ICIPE has 
been unable to push its solution more broadly, and repellent collars are seen by many as a rather eccentric, 
and ineffective, alternative to the mainstream chemical solutions focused on suppressing fly populations. 
Baits and traps 
As a direct response to the destructive land clearance, wildlife extermination and chemical spraying 
alternatives, trap technologies were developed. The earliest ‘Harris traps’ were used in South Africa 
(Swynnerton 1933). They did not use odour baits but simply used visual stimuli. It was only through the work 
on fly behaviour and how they are attracted to odours in particular that new more effectively technologies 
were developed. This particularly took place in Zimbabwe (then Southern Rhodesia) from the mid 1960s 
through the persistent and innovative scientific efforts of Glyn Vale (although there were parallel efforts in the 
Francophone parts of Africa, with the Laveissiere trap being a prime output,  (cf. Laveissiere and Couret 1981)). 
Vale came to Southern Rhodesia in 1965, and was given the freedom to work on tsetse fly behaviour by the 
then head of veterinary services, Desmond Lovemore. He explained, 'Nobody knew what was going on with 
tsetse flies […] I was given free rein. He said he [Lovemore] would do what he would do to help. The resources 
were there. He said go out there. Give me an answer in three years. I went off and played a bit.'52 
The Rukomichi research station in the Zambezi valley became a hub of activity, attracting other scientists such 
as John Hargrove, and later, after Independence, Steve Torr. An incredible body of research was developed, 
based on detailed studies of fly movement, population ecology and disease epidemiology (see for example 
                                                          
50 Interview, researcher, Edinburgh, 6 June 2013 
51 Interview, researcher, 12 July 2013 
52 Interview, Glyn Vale, Zimbabwe, 24 June 2013 
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Esterhuizen et al. 2011 among many, many others; Hargrove 1988, 2000, 2005; Lindh et al. 2009; Vale 1974a, 
1974b; Vale and Hall et al. 1988; Vale and Lovemore et al. 1988; Vale and Torr 2005a). 'They had some very 
clever people who worked there – Vale, Hargrove, and so on. They could do experiments on a gargantuan 
scale. They had money to support them. Vale had hundreds of people working for him, collecting flies and so 
on,'53 explained one informant. 'Zimbabwe was the epicentre of the tsetse world.'54 As someone else observed 
'Glyn is a quite remarkable scientist.'55 His close colleague John Hargrove explained, 'He revolutionised our 
knowledge of tsetse behaviour, and the role of odours in flies finding their hosts. Glyn has enormous energy. 
He had brilliant field techniques. He wanted to make better targets.'56 
Vale explained, 'We wanted something that was non-polluting. We didn’t want to use DDT or dieldrin, to 
plaster tonnes and tonnes across the bush. The environmental people didn’t like it, nor indeed the tsetse 
people. Shooting all the game animals was another option. Some of the wildlife people liked this. They were 
keen on hunting. Bush clearing was highly destructive. We wanted something else.'57 
In the early days resources were no object it seemed, and huge numbers of people were employed to collect 
data, dissect flies and test the traps. Through much of the liberation war the work continued with everyone 
from the Prime Minister, Ian Smith, to various ministers and dignitaries visiting the research station. This was 
cutting edge Rhodesian research, funded by the UDI Government in the face of international sanctions, focused 
on fighting the fly, just as they were then fighting the ‘terrorists’ in the bush. 
When Zimbabwe became independent in 1980 the basic infrastructure, and many of the former staff, including 
Vale, remained. The veterinary department remained ‘very white’ for a long period, with the same mentalities, 
convictions and associated plans retained. Recalling this period in southern Africa, someone joked, 'It was 
white guys in baggy shorts and knee length socks. A particular type of science. A great gig. You could be in the 
bush, drive around in land rovers. They have a belief that they have the answer. But they are in their own little 
bubble. They don’t even touch the socio-political aspects. It was a very British, ex-colonial scene.'58 Another 
informant observed, 'It was all very top down. And it was dominated by whites. For a long time it was always 
whites at the top in Zimbabwe, even after Independence.'59 Another commented on the social dimension, 'The 
white males stuck together. They were a tribe.'60 The gendered nature of expertise was also commented on, 'It 
was white males, mad on flies.'61 Yet despite the racialised and gendered context for science and policy in the 
transition to independence, in southern Africa at least, there was also continuity in the science, and the 
unquestionably high quality work on fly behaviour and traps continued.  
This was given a massive boost with the inception of the RTTCP (see above), seen by the European Union (EU) 
as part of the support to the front-line states, but suitably ‘apolitical’, focused as it was on flies, cattle disease 
and development. Significantly, the RTTCP also supported the bureaucratic and professional interests of 
                                                          
53 Interview, researcher, Germany, 24 June 2013 
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veterinarians (and, to a lesser extent, entomologists), 'It was led by vets. This was a time when veterinary 
services were being privatised, and they were fighting for funds. They needed the funds to continue to justify 
their own existence. They wanted funds for vaccination, for mass prophylaxis. They didn’t always see the 
broader goal.'62 Yet the whole operation was highly dependent on external funds and longer-term sustainability 
became an issue. 'After 1980 Zimbabwe was swimming in funds. Once something is moving you don’t stop it. 
So all these people were hired after 1980s to do tsetse control […] But when the cash started to dry up […]you 
now have a huge tsetse department, but no operating funds.'63 
As noted already, there was a strong distaste in Brussels for a return to spraying campaigns, despite the 
advocacy of many of the veterinary officials, and it was the bait technology that attracted the funders. This was 
'simple, elegant and clean,'64 and was to be rolled out across the whole southern African region. Bait 
technology really grabbed the EU.  
Vale was not so sure that his technology had been perfected, and recalled, 'I didn’t want to get it going. More 
research was needed. I always want to travel hopefully, but not arrive. I wanted to tie up loose ends to my 
satisfaction. But they said the regional programme would not happen unless you get started […]It made me get 
off my backside, and get something going.'65 
 RTTCP was a massive experiment, and a real test to this approach. Thousands of traps were distributed across 
vast areas. Again, because of the reproductive biology of the tsetse fly, killing very few flies could result in a 
diminution of populations in a relatively short period. When well organised, again with a top-down, hierarchical 
approach in the tradition of past colonial campaigns, the trapping worked reasonably well. This was the case in 
parts of Zimbabwe for example, where a high capacity veterinary service in the colonial tradition was retained 
for a period. As Vale explained, 'It has to be organised and planned properly. When it first started in the1980s it 
worked magnificently.'66 
Elsewhere, however, particularly as structural adjustment began to bite, the capacity of government services to 
implement and sustain such a large-scale programme was weaker, even with the considerable resources 
available from the RTTCP. Local people often did not understand what the traps were for, and did not in any 
case rate trypanosomiasis as a major problem. One observer commented, 'Trapping – it’s more trouble than 
it’s worth. It’s a logistical nightmare. There are all sorts of other uses for blue or black cloth.'67 Another recalled 
that villagers found better uses for the traps, 'The netting used on some designs was perfect for fishing nets. 
The blue cloths were good curtains. And the aluminium frames were perfect for door posts and window 
frames.'68 
 Community compliance and sustainability became a big issue. In the Lambwe Valley of Kenya, a site of 
extensive and long term research on tsetse and tryps, community programmes facilitated by ICIPE took off 
(Barrett and Okali April 1998; Ssenyonga et al. 1996). These involved community participation from the start,  
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from trap construction to placement to management. This had a great effect, but required local level 
community organisation and buy in. Participatory development, even by the 1990s when these approaches 
became more and more in vogue, was not a strong point of the average veterinary department. The 
institutional culture and the professional training ran against interacting with people. As a researcher involved 
in that initiative put it, 'Vets.. vets […] they are not terribly participatory. They saw it all as a vet problem […] 
The vets just wanted to get the last fly. There was a total obsession […] If the community could do it, could they 
do it for long enough? They just could not hand over. Because it’s about power and status. It’s about their own 
training. "We are vets, we don’t deal with people," is the line. The training curricula haven’t changed in 40 
years. They think they are doctors.'69 
 With the trap technologies, there were always challenges of reinvasion. Trapping was a long term solution that 
had to be sustained, particularly in border areas for years. Some suggested that this was a 30-40 year 
challenge. As African governments became more and more reliant on donor support, projects would not last 
for more than a few years. Even a massive prestige project such as the RTTCP had only one renewal, and was 
wound down in 1998-9. As one informant explained, 'In retrospect, the targets didn’t produce the results that 
they hoped for. In the end, RTTCP was a lot of money down the drain.'70 Perhaps this assessment is too 
pessimistic. Vale counters, 'If we didn’t have the bait system, the whole of Zimbabwe would have gone down. 
All gone down.'71 
Such efforts were thus subject to the whims of aid industry fashions. In some people’s views, the RTTCP 
morphed into a generic rural development programme, so losing the focus on tsetse control, much to the 
chagrin of those who saw this is as the only priority. And in respect of government support, political change, 
external conditionalities from international finance institutions and the wider political economy of 
development, all had effects. Despite the special pleading of the veterinarians and the entomologists, it was 
not possible to sustain funding for pet projects supporting pet technologies for ever. 
The nuclear solution 
However, in the tsetse control field there seems to be always some group somewhere who has managed to 
convince someone that ‘their’ solution is going to work, and should be the next big thing. The Sterile Insect 
Technique (SIT) promoted by the International Atomic Energy Authority gained prominence through the 2000s 
(Feldmann and Parker 2010), just as other options and their funding were faltering.72 This came from an 
unusual source and was presented as part of the IAEA’s advocacy of ‘peaceful uses’ of nuclear technology. 
'Every country that signed the non-proliferation treaty would like some benefits from signing,' explained IAEA’s 
Udo Feldmann.73 
As discussed earlier, irradiating male insects and releasing them in very large numbers had worked for fruit flies 
and screw worms, particularly in the Americas. The US Government, through the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) support to IAEA, heavily backed the idea that this technology could be used to conquer at 
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last the tsetse fly in Africa. As someone put it, 'The males would come in like knights in shining armour and take 
all the females!'74 
This was presented as part of a strong narrative of eradication by the African Union (see above). The idea of 
eradication goes down well with veterinarians and policymakers. Getting rid of a vector of a disease is a great 
achievement, as has been the case with smallpox and rinderpest. These are the iconic disease eradication 
campaigns that everyone wants to replicate. Selling the potential of this is very much part of the rhetoric, even 
if the likelihood of this ever happening is exceedingly slim. 'SIT needs to be seen as part of a success story. This 
is what attracts people,' explained Feldman. He went on, acknowledging the limitations, 'Of course it depends 
on the situation […] SIT is not applicable everywhere […] It is always part of an integrated approach.'75 
The IAEA had tested their approach on the island of Zanzibar – in fact in a fairly isolated patch of forest – and 
through prior suppression of the population by 95 per cent and the repeated release of sterile males over 
several years, and with the expenditure of perhaps millions of dollars, they had managed successfully to 
eliminate the tsetse fly from this area (Vreysen 2001; Vreysen et al. 2000). This was written up and 
promulgated as a massive military-style success story, glorified as ‘winning the battle’ and ‘waging a war’,76  the 
final solution to the scourge of the tsetse fly across Africa, with this case deployed to justify the roll out of the 
approach across Africa.  
But as a consultant commented, 'SIT in Zanzibar worked. It was one species, on an island, with 1000km2 of 
infestation. But on the mainland it’s a different story. You can see all of Africa as ‘pocket’ if you like, but you 
have game areas without access, large areas of forest with no access at all, and you have 23 different species. 
Surely Zanzibar is not a good model.'77 Everyone of course likes a success story, no matter how peculiar, 
context specific and expensive. The details can be brushed under the carpet for the purpose of the big sell, and 
then the subsequent details worked out.  The IAEA are not the only organisation, and SIT not the only 
technology, that has used such a tactic in the harsh world of competitive funding. Gaining a strong political ally 
in the African Union, deploying an articulate African advocate in John Kabayo, and inveigling your way into the 
international bodies was also part of the strategy. Again, the exact same tactics used by others, but perhaps 
not so effectively.  
The SIT approach, and the role of the IAEA and PATTEC’s advocacy of SIT, provoked massive controversy, 
outrage and anger among the small tsetse and tryps community. According to some, 'The SIT approach has 
been massively oversold.'78 Some of this was of course jealousy, ' how dare they capture the increasingly scarce 
funds when we have worked so long and hard working out solutions?' But part of it was legitimate scientific 
concern. 'SIT is only applicable if eradication is the objective. It has no role in the tsetse and tryps control 
armoury, unless elimination is the goal, other cheaper methods don’t work and reinvasion can realistically and 
economically be prevented.'79 
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A vicious war of words ensued, with a variety of papers, vitriolic responses and harsh critiques offered. My 
interviews almost inevitably turned to this subject. Views were heart-felt and strong. 'Now it’s a big political 
thing. This is my view. It’s a sexy way of giving nuclear power a jolly green ecological face. Nuclear power, as a 
green, alternative, clean solution,' argued one informant.80 Another commented, 'IAEA is distorting what is 
happening. SIT is hugely expensive. It requires massive suppression to work at all. And why would you do SIT 
when you have other perfectly good and cheaper alternatives?'81 Another observed, 'It’s all ridiculously 
complicated and expensive,'82 while another commented, 'Anyone who believes this can work is crazy,'83 
Accusations of skulduggery were often not far below the surface, 'It’s a political game. It is the basis for an 
awful lot of corruption. SIT involves a lot of funds. The fly factory will come to your area, brings benefits, they 
say. But the Ethiopian one has not released a single fly.'84 The wider politics of funding and control was often a 
subject of comment. 'The colonisation of the mind is a real problem in this field. Working just to the tune of the 
external expert or funder is a real syndrome […]Rinderpest has become iconic, part of the social fabric. But it’s 
not the only way.'85 Indeed, it was the apparent competition between control methods that was the most 
frequent subject of discussion. One dismissed SIT outright. 'They had a nice toy looking for another place to 
play.'86 another was more compromising, 'I have nothing against SIT. A tool, we have it. Under certain 
conditions it can work. If the tsetse population is isolated, and the chance of reinvasion is zero, and suppression 
can be implemented, then, yes, SIT can work.'87 Indeed the overall evolution of the debate was acknowledged 
by some, and heavily emphasised by IAEA. An outsider commented, 'PATTEC has evolved. They have been 
backing away from SIT. A shift from eradication to sustained control. They could not breed enough flies. It was 
a major setback for them. You still hear rumblings of eradication, but it’s more sensible now.'88 
All of this sparked big debates in the scientific literature. In particular there was a to-and-fro of different 
models, each arguing for and against the efficacy and efficiency of the SIT approach, especially in comparison 
to others (Barclay and Vreysen 2011a, 2011b; Hargrove et al. 2011 and more recently; Bouyer et al. 2013; Shaw 
et al. 2013a,b), (see also Vale and Torr 2005b). Commenting on the 2011 model by Barclay and Vreysen, one of 
the protagonists recalled:  
There was a huge scene. They tried to write to our funders. There were all sorts of red herrings. They 
said our model was no good. In order to show that SIT worked they had to make some horrendously 
bold assumptions [in their model]. We know they weren’t true […] later it was acknowledged [that] it 
was a complete load of guff […] Tsetse lives a long time […] It’s fundamental biology. If you live a long 
time, it doesn’t matter a monkey’s stitch if you have sterile males. SIT is fundamentally inappropriate.89 
Much of this debate has, in my view, rather missed the point. Framed as a competition over techniques and 
tools – which one is ‘better’, mine or yours? – the bigger picture was often lost. What was all this effort for? 
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And was it actually tackling a problem at all? In the end this dispute, still on-going and seemingly unabated, was 
about politics, funding and prestige. Who was going to capture and control the agenda? And with US backing, 
and new funds leveraged under the narrative of peaceful nuclear solutions, the SIT approach was always going 
to gain the upper hand compared to the low-tech, local solutions advocated by others, no matter what the 
debates about biology, economics, social acceptability and so on were. 
Drugs and vaccines 
Another suite of alternatives has focused not on the vector but on the parasite itself, through the development 
of prophylactic and therapeutic drugs for animals, as well as that ultimate Holy Grail, a vaccine. Here the 
argument suggests that treating the disease directly makes more sense, especially as the relationship between 
fly densities and disease incidence is not clear. A range of drugs were developed from the 1950s, and later 
came off-patent, and have been produced as generics for very low cost since the 1990s. Also, over the last 40 
years, there have been attempts to produce an animal vaccine. 
The drugs (notably diminazene aceturate (mostly for chemotherapy), isometamidium chloride (for 
chemoprohylaxis) and homidium salts (for chemotherapy)) are reasonably effective, relatively easy to 
administer, and especially as generics very cheap.90 This can be, advocates argue, a livestock owner led 
solution, delivered through agro-vets and the private sector drug companies, and therefore not reliant on 
large-scale government led control campaigns. The big challenge is regulation, both of the quality of the 
products, particularly of generics, and the problem of counterfeits, and of the dosing regimes that may result in 
resistance to the current class of drugs (cf. Chitanga et al. 2011; Delespaux and de Koning 2007; McDermott et 
al. 2003; Mungube et al. 2012; Van den Bossche et al. 2000). 
Others argue that a herder driven drug treatment approach may be alright in some areas, on the margins of 
tsetse distributions, but in the focal areas where tsetse challenge is high a more concerted fly control campaign 
is necessary. By not tackling the underlying cause of disease, they argue, the potential for epidemic outbreaks, 
potentially spilling over into humans, remains and the costs of not engaging in a proper vector control 
campaign may be disastrous.   
Such debates of course are again about asserting control over the problem, and therefore over the solution 
too. While there is much rhetoric about integrated solutions, holistic approaches, and ‘One Health’ policies, the 
practice is very much about territory, control, and capturing resources. As resources have been increasingly 
squeezed, especially for government veterinary departments, local, private sector, solutions are not seen 
positively. The memory of the large-scale operations, with thousands of staff and huge levels of equipment and 
resources, is still relatively recent and formed the basis of the early careers of many current senior officials. 
Today the Land Rovers are out of commission and lying derelict around the offices and the droves of workers 
have been laid off.  
A private sector solution, especially developed through ‘public private partnership’, is very much the flavour of 
the age, however, and some new players have entered the scene to advocate such solutions. GALVmed, for 
example, is modelled on the GAVI Alliance, that has been successful in the human health domain.91 GALVmed 
articulated an argument for the development of a new class of trypanosome drugs and the development of a 
vaccine that would provide a medical solution to the problem using the latest recombinant genetics 
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technologies, cutting edge drug development platforms, and novel approaches to private sector development 
and delivery. As a technology development broker and market initiator, GALVmed argued effectively that they 
could be the missing piece of the puzzle in the task of delivering new technologies to tackle neglected diseases 
in poor areas of the world. The UK Department for International Development (DFID) invited them to develop a 
flagship programme around animal trypanosomiasis, and offered £8million of support.92 
As a counter to the old style of tsetse control, based on large scale government programmes, this was 
presented as a new, streamlined, and cutting edge technology driven solution, imbued with private sector 
values and efficiencies. This was very much in the vein of other solutions being promoted by GALVmed’s co-
funder, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, whether around crop technologies to deliver the African ‘green 
revolution’ or health technologies for human disease, where private sector solutions are sought in a new vision 
of development. Such an approach certainly has, in theory, some clear advantages over the cumbersome, 
expensive, top-down approaches of the past, but there are also limits. 
GALVmed argues that it has in the pipeline a new class of drugs. These are more efficient, less toxic and easier 
to administer than existing drug solutions, they claim. A low cost diagnostic tool is also in development to be 
used in field settings, again at low cost. They equally make the case that these new classes of drugs can meet 
the increasingly stringent regulatory requirements that national governments and international protocols 
require. Such regulations, they claim, will drive up the prices of competitors' drugs making their new products 
competitive in the market. While the market is relatively small it is not insignificant (estimated at EUR80million 
in total, adding in around EUR40million of lower quality or counterfeit products), and as producers have higher 
value animals to protect, the incentives to protect them will increase. With a new, more stringent regulatory 
regime in place, new products will fare well, they argue. A GALVmed representative explained:  
There are whole issues of quality control. A lack of regulation... Some people don’t believe it’s a 
problem. But we have been doing research which shows that 50 per cent are substandard or 
counterfeits. And there is more counterfeiting in the rural areas where there is less control […] 
Enforcement is the big challenge. We need good regulation. It’s a big issue with human drugs. But the 
same with veterinary drugs too... The cost of drugs is driving the market. But they are cheap because of 
generics and counterfeits. They will definitely go up in price with greater regulation. The live weight of 
animals is increasing across Africa. Animals are worth thousands of euros. It is worth the producer 
investing. The problem is there is no incentive to stock the drugs by the better manufacturers, as they 
are undermined by others […] Currently commercial risk is heightened by the lack of regulation of the 
market. Effective regulation derisks the product.93 
There are quite a few ifs and buts in this argument, however. Much relies on the control of the cheaper, lower 
quality generics (and counterfeit) market, and the convincing of producers that a higher quality product is 
worth paying for (if and when it is actually produced) (cf. Bardosh et al. 2013). Others question the push to 
greater regulation, arguing that the informal markets are actually providing reasonably good quality products: 
There is a real push back from vets and companies. The market is so small. There is just enough cash in 
trypanocides to attract the private sector, but only just. They want quality control. More vets, more 
cars. Our work showed in West African markets in the mid-2000s, formal and informal, we didn’t find 
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anything bad. Counterfeits are rare. Generics are low price, so there’s a low incentive. They have been 
off patent for 10-15 years, so there is a mature market now.94 
Clearly much hangs on the extent of low quality and fake products in the market and the implications this has 
for longer-term problems of resistance, that is in turn compounded by widespread underdosing.95 Labs 
developed by GALVmed in Senegal and Tanzania are currently testing drug quality across a number of 
countries.  This remains a live debate, but one replete with political economy questions. There are pressures 
for increasing regulations from regulators (who need jobs and resources), from pharma companies (who can 
increase profits from new products), but also from those who make a living from the informal market.  Diverse 
interests are at play, and disputes remain over the extent of the market for new products given the mature 
generics market, the level of local demand, and ability to pay, as well as the scale and impact of under-dosing, 
sub-standard products, and drug counterfeiting.  
As with many technology driven efforts, the investment in drug development has gone into the upstream 
science, and not into the downstream market testing and delivery. As one informant noted, 'There is a gap. 
Ideas are developed in isolation of thinking about the delivery systems. Unless you develop the technology with 
a delivery system in mind, it will end up too expensive, and sit on the shelf. Tryps falls into this problem just like 
most other efforts.'96 
In the GALVmed case much effort is being invested in exploring the market conditions and ensuring effective 
delivery mechanisms but what if the technology, developed at such expense, does not meet market demand? 
This would not be the first time a new technological solution, even if it worked well, met an early fate as the 
assumed mass of consumers refused to buy it. The real challenge, often poorly recognised and understood, is 
the social and political context of such markets. There are plenty of vested interests in not regulating drugs, 
and keeping poorly performing generics and counterfeits. Even if these were overcome, the ability to regulate 
drug markets in remote rural settings is very limited. And in any case the costs of off-patent drugs are so low 
that competitors would have to offer very substantial added value. While some claim that low quality, 
counterfeits and under-dosing is a real problem, others argue that it is not such a problem, and that livestock 
keepers have developed capacities to discriminate between drug types, and have good knowledge of 
application processes. 
Most commentators regard the pursuit of new drug discovery channels as a useful thing to do, although 
questions are raised about how much de-risking support should be offered to large private pharmaceutical 
companies from public aid or philanthropic money. However the same view is not shared when the technology 
development is focused on a vaccine.  
Vaccine development for trypanosomiasis has a chequered history. ILRAD spent the best part of 30 years from 
the early 1970s in pursuit of a trypanosomiasis vaccine (ILRAD 1991). The effort failed completely, and the work 
was finally shut down in the early 2000s after a thorough-going review (e.g. Budd 1999). An ILRI insider 
commented, 'There was good science, but it was a random walk. There is no point in fiddling around with more 
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and more responses. There was not a rational basis for continuing.97 Given this history, questions about new 
initiatives are inevitably raised: 
From 1972 to about 2002, there was high class science, good work on immunology and so on. But the 
practical outputs were nil. The tryps vaccine work was closed, after a very thorough review. And then 
along comes GALVmed. They are all new faces. A new generation of researchers. We’ve been asking 
the question – why are they going down the same track? It was the same old story. Selling a new hope, 
a new solution… How on earth was that allowed to happen?98 
In a similar vein: 
We spent the whole of the twentieth century learning that vaccines don’t work... donors don’t have 
technical advisors who can say ‘hang on a minute’. It’s a tragedy of Shakespearean proportions. So 
much money wasted!99 
There are good reasons why vaccine development is difficult, if not impossible. This has to do with the way 
trypanosomes change their antigenic covering, making it virtually impossible to generate a vaccine response. 
As someone argued: 
Now we have the Gates programme, and silver bullets and grand challenges. Everyone wants a new 
vaccine or drug […]Ridiculous. GALVmed have got millions from Gates and DFID for work on a vaccine 
for tryps100 […]There have been some very clever people over 20 years doing research on tryps showing 
that they change their coat – not even in response to antibodies. There are thousands of genes 
controlling the coat, and it changes all the time […] It will be a total waste of money.101 
 Parallels are drawn with the HIV virus and others where millions have been sunk into failed vaccine 
development efforts. Given the ILRAD story, it was with some surprise that funds were approved to work on a 
new vaccine under GALVmed’s programme. In the end, only 9 per cent of the £8million DFID grant was 
allocated to vaccine development, and only one candidate was chosen as having potential. A development 
process was financed involving a collaboration between the University of Bordeaux and commercial partners. 
New laboratories have been developed in Mozambique, Ethiopia and Burkina Faso and animal testing has been 
underway. The rationale was explained by GALVmed, 'The potential is so big, and the effect so massive, it’s 
worth trying. We wanted to stimulate interest in this area. There have been lots of past attempts. It may not 
work. But there have been advances in immunology since.'102 
Even so the prospects of a commercialisable vaccine emerging look slight and vaccine development has not 
been included in refunding proposals. But, it is argued, the capacity for animal testing and the development of 
laboratories has been achieved, even if not a likely product.  Others argue that this has been a monumental 
waste of money.  
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Certainly the allure of the technological silver bullet is strong and a good sell and, especially based on a private 
sector solution, is often one that wins the funds. However, the trypanosomiasis vaccine and drug story shows 
that there are other issues at play, beyond the simple ‘derisking’ of product development and market testing. 
Unregulated drug markets are difficult ones in which to compete, and the prospects for European or US style 
regulation are slim in Africa, for a number of economic and political reasons. Beyond the technical difficulties of 
achieving a vaccine solution there are other delivery questions that have yet to be addressed. These may be 
long-run options, but for poor livestock keepers in remote parts of Africa the prospects of such solutions 
delivering anything soon look unlikely. That the well-funded institute ILRAD failed over 40 years is witness to 
the steepness of the challenge. Sceptics (and I encountered quite a few) argue that there are cheaper, less 
sexy, solutions that are possible and the funds could be better invested elsewhere, while others counter that 
pursuing all options is essential.  
Breeding resistance  
Another long-running story in tackling the animal trypanosomiasis has been focused on breeding. There are 
number of indigenous cattle breeds, most notably the N’dama and West African Shorthorn breeds, that show 
characteristics of trypanotolerance (Roberts and Gray 1973; Strewart 1951).103 The International 
Trypanotolerance Centre was established in the Gambia in 1982 to build on this.104 Making use of this genetic 
material in cross-breeding efforts was, it was hoped, a route to producing better quality (larger, with greater 
meat and milk production potential) breeds that were also trypanotolerant. ILCA, and then ILRI, were engaged 
in this research in The Gambia and Senegal and had a number of core breeding herds across West and Central 
Africa that were integrated into the cattle breeding programmes over a number of years (Hoste et al. 1992; 
Murray et al. 1984). The results were mixed. As many have argued, small, indigenous, low productivity animals 
that have repeated tsetse challenges are often resistant to trypanosomiasis.  
This is why trypanosomiasis is not regarded as a major animal health priority by people in tsetse areas, 
especially if the challenge is slight, occasional or can be avoided (cf. Torr et al. 2011). It is only when people and 
animals move in from outside, or when susceptible breeds are used as in large-scale ranching operations that it 
becomes a big problem, it is argued. This was of course John Ford’s argument back in the 1960s (see above), 
and is repeated by many livestock keepers. It is therefore a question less of disease challenge, than of the type 
of production system. Indigenous systems, for a range of reasons, were always quite resilient and with a 
judicious combination of approaches, including the use of local breeds, this could be the same again. 
This approach of course does not chime well with the objectives of technology centres who seek a technical 
solution, and see their role primarily as focused on milk and meat production. As a researcher put it, 'these 
resistant breeds are too small and unproductive for the breeders.'105 Multiple use breeds that produce some 
meat and milk, but are also used for draft power and transport, and are disease resistant, are often not the 
priority. Size matters and volume matters. The N’dama breeding however did continue for many years, and still 
does under the auspices of a multi-million dollar biodiversity driven programme, protecting genetic diversity in 
situ supported by the Global Environment Fund and the African Development Fund.106  Building on earlier 
                                                          
103 Of course the challenges of bovine trypanosomiasis can be traced much further back to the pre-colonial era and the 
introduction of Bos indica and its crossing with the much more tolerant indigenous B. taurus.  
104 http://www.itc.gm/ 
105 Interview, researcher, Addis Ababa, 6 June 2013 
106 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/MN-2005-144-EN-ADF-BD-WP-
MULTINATIONAL-AR-PROJECT-FOR-SUSTAINABLE-MGT-OF-ENDEMIC-RUMINANT-LIVESTOCK-IN-W.A.PDF 
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initiatives, an ILCA/ILRAD programme (d'Ieteren and Trail 1987) continued in the forests of the Democratic 
Republic Congo, among other sites, for many years until closed down. Later N’dama cattle were moved to 
breeding programmes in East Africa in the hope of developing locally appropriate crosses, but they succumbed 
to East Coast Fever. As one scientist explained, 'With low persistent infection, they are reservoirs of the 
disease. But with high tsetse challenge, they die just like any other cattle. Or they get something else and 
die.'107 Trypanotolerance evolves through co-existence with the disease, and so is not easily transferrable, 
'Over time, trypanosomes become tamed, domesticated. They become used to domestic livestock. Where you 
give it time, where tryps and livestock live together in a farming landscape there is less of a problem; it goes 
away.'108 
As Ford and many others have argued, animal breeds, diseases and production practices necessarily must co-
evolve in particular places and transplanting solutions, especially attempts at universal solutions,  simply do not 
work. And this is perhaps especially the case with a disease like animal trypanosomiasis that has so many 
different types of vectors with different behaviours and habitat requirements, a diversity of domestic and wild 
intermediate hosts, and a diversity of parasites that cause quite different types of disease symptoms.    
The search for a generic technical solution however continues. Breeding in particular has been given a new 
lease of life by a new generation of biotechnology solutions, allowing genetic screening and the ability to insert 
transgenes and so speed up the process of selection dramatically. Despite the furore of 'Genetically modified 
organisms' (GMOs), and also the legitimate regulatory concerns about potential environmental and health 
impacts, the development of genetically modified animals has continued, at least in a low key way. From Dolly 
the sheep to Tumaini the cloned calf, some important scientific developments have occurred. A collaboration 
between ILRI, the Roslin Institute in Scotland, and Michigan State University has recently been announced, with 
a transgene from the trypanosomiasis resistant baboon to be inserted into a cow.109 
The work is very preliminary and remains to be fully field tested, and it is not clear how broad a level of 
resistance will be conferred, or whether such transgenic animals will be acceptable to regulators and 
producers. Is this the genetic silver bullet everyone has been waiting for, or yet another interesting scientific 
diversion, involving lots of funds, plenty of papers but no useful product? Only time will tell. Certainly the 
motivation, and incentives, towards a technical solution remains strong, and the biotechnology advocates will 
not shy away from making massive claims about the potentials, or even the pipelines in development. In the 
GM crops field we have heard this incessantly for well over a decade now, yet the range of traits, and their 
efficacy is both limited and widely questioned, as is the potential for the narrowing of choice, and the 
dominance of particular commercial concerns in their marketing (Glover 2009).  
                                                          
107 Interview, researcher, Edinburgh, 21 June 2013 
108 Interview, researcher, Germany, 24 June 2013 
109 http://www.ilri.org/ilrinews/index.php/archives/10937; see also: http://www.ilri.org/breadtrypanosome 
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4. Competing narratives: trypanosomiasis control and the politics of 
development 
While there is unquestionably excellent science that continues, whether on fly behaviour and attractants, 
sterile insect techniques, drug discovery, immunology, animal breeding or genetic engineering, these efforts 
are largely focused on particular solutions to a problem framed in a particular way. The argument runs that 
tsetse and trypanosomiasis is a major scourge, and prevents development, keeping poor people and areas 
poor. Removing the fly and tackling the disease must result in improvements, sometimes substantial, and so 
justifies the control intervention. Any research and development that improves the situation is thus deemed a 
good investment, and the search for the ideal, hopefully generic, technical solution – that preferably eradicates 
but if not eliminates in areas, or if not controls to acceptable levels – is always worth searching for. This 
‘techno-fix narrative’ as we have seen dominates the discussion, and most policy debates focus in on looking at 
different control measures, but all are framed by the same overarching problem-solution narrative.  
Yet, as hinted at above, this is countered by what might be termed a 'conservationist narrative'. This posits that 
tsetse flies, and the associated disease problems, reside in marginal areas, often of little productive value for 
agriculture and livestock rearing. New settlement into these areas following tsetse clearance causes great 
environmental damage to the often fragile ecologies of such settings – such as river valleys or low lying valley 
areas. Furthermore, the value of such sites is not in small-scale peasant agriculture, but in the value of 
biodiversity, ecosystem services and ‘existence values’, requiring the conservation of these often unique 
environments. Such environments, the narrative posits, represent a global public good, and should not be 
transformed through disease control interventions. Indeed such wilderness areas can be 'sold' to protect them, 
to tourists interested to see, or hunters wishing to shoot, large game (cf. McAfee 1999). This, the 
conservationist narrative runs, is the true value of such areas, and investing huge effort in clearing flies makes 
little sense. People, except for tourists, game wardens and hunters, are not part of this landscape, and farmers 
and herders should be prevented from using such areas. They should be relocated through resettlement 
projects, and thus cleared from these vulnerable and valuable areas. As a conservation organisation official put 
it, 'If you get rid of tryps and tsetse, there could be large-scale land use change. Tryps keeps marginal areas 
marginal.'110 
Recalling the concerns of John Ford, and indeed the perspectives of local livestock keepers, we might ask: is all 
this actually missing the point? Is there not an alternative narrative still?  Is the problem not the fly and the 
disease but the lack of people, infrastructure, markets and wider development activity? The fly infested areas 
have retreated over time dramatically across the continent, contracting back to small areas that are often 
remote and usually very poor. Such areas are not being kept pristine by the fly but, according to this narrative, 
the lack of economic opportunity. Is the disease therefore the cause of such marginality or is it actually the 
result of it? Has the focus on technical solutions actually taken our eye off a discussion of what the actual 
problem is? Is all this effort at control missing the point? Such a 'developmental narrative', following John Ford, 
argues that in pre-colonial times, and in much of remote Africa today, a light, but frequent challenge may build 
up resistance. Vegetation management and herd control can act to reduce impact further. And if outbreaks 
occur there are cheap drugs to treat animals, and the impact on humans is small compared with many other 
health challenges. Singular technical solutions in any case do not work well, given the biological complexities of 
                                                          
110 Interview, conservation organisation official, New York, 25 June 2013 
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the disease and its ecology. Countering trypanosomiasis involves fighting many different flies and different 
diseases, and spending huge resources supporting massive operations to push back fly belts is always 
vulnerable. There will always be reinvasion, and this may be more risky than leaving things at a low level 
anyway. And in the long term, land use removes tsetse habitat and more people, more livestock, more 
settlement, infrastructure, economic activity means less flies, less disease without going to the effort of 
control. As one informant argued, 'Without these big programmes, we are going back to what farmers always 
did. The farmers are doing their own thing. Selecting what cattle to use, selecting the drugs, choosing vector 
control methods […] Something simple is the answer. Farmers are going it alone pretty much.'111 
Yet this is not an argument for doing nothing. It is more a reflection of the current situation in many places. 
And in some places there remains a worrying residual level of infestation: on the margins, in river valleys, in 
denser bush, in frontier lands, with trypanosomiasis affecting poor people and their livestock, including 
marginalised squatters, hunters, gatherers and herders. Such residual areas also affect tourists and trophy 
hunters, and those who bring resources to such areas. As one informant argued, 'The clients come to Mana 
Pools (a national park in the Zambezi valley of Zimbabwe), and they don't want disease. If you don’t make cash 
out of game reserves, they are finished.'112 
Also, if the status quo is accepted, human trypanosomiasis can rear a very ugly head, often very suddenly, as in 
Uganda in the 1990s. In addition, there is also a fear that systematic under-reporting and poor diagnosis (Odiit 
et al. 2005) means we do not have a clear picture of the problem anyway, even in other areas. A case history of 
a Tanzanian game warden is an alarming, but perhaps common, example, with a series of misdiagnoses and 
failure to treat with tragic consequences (see also Katsidzira and Fana 2010; Bukachi et al. 2009; Sindato et al. 
2008).  In a strange twist to the debate, it is the tourism, safari, and hunting communities who are perhaps 
some of the main advocates of trypanosomiasis control today, coming as they do with money and influence 
not available to those living in poverty in such marginal areas. Also, perhaps as a repeat of the white settler 
experience of the colonial era, there may yet be advocacy for tsetse clearance from investors wishing to 
develop large-scale farms, as part of what has been dubbed ‘land grabbing’. As a consultant put it, 'The greed 
for land is not going to be offset by some tsetse flies.'113 
These three narratives frame the problem and solution in very different ways. And the ascendancy of each 
depends on their advocates and their political weight. As discussed in previous sections, the 'techno-fix 
narrative' has been by far the most dominant over many years, although there are strong environmental 
lobbies for a conservationist compromise in some areas. This has given rise to some concessions towards a 
more integrative approach – what might be a nascent fourth narrative. Such a 'One Health narrative', 
highlighting integration, holism and multi-disciplinarity is frequently peddled, at least as a version of the 
'techno-fix' narrative, around integrated control solutions. But, despite the nods towards broader systems 
understanding, integrating veterinary, medical and environmental disciplines and holistic solutions, the 
practice remains very compartmentalised. Everyone is fighting their corner, trying to get limited funds for their 
technologies, tied up with a particular narrative of vector and disease control that suits their technical solution, 
and, as the previous sections have shown, reflecting careers, disciplines institutions and funding streams.  
                                                          
111 Interview, consultant, Triana, 20 June 2013 
112 Interview, researcher, Harare, 24 June 2013 
113 Interview, consultant, UK, 6 June 2013 
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Such competition can sometimes be healthy, part of a productive scientific debate. However, very often it is 
not. A number of informants reflected on this. One commented, 'In this field there is no honest broker. It is 
completely hijacked. There are conflicting interests. It’s horrendous.'114 Another observed:  
It would not be healthy if everyone agreed. But tsetse control is very controversial. There are lots of 
disputes. I wish that irrespective of which technique is preferred that we worked together to show 
success and when this generates funds, we all benefit. We support each other to raise funds, not just 
argue against each other. It’s always going to be an integrated approach anyway.'115 
Why then do people not come together and look at both problems and solutions in a more integrated fashion? 
Positions, as earlier sections of this paper have shown, are very entrenched. Claims of ‘One Health’ and 
‘Integrated Pest Management’ are ever present, but most activities are fragmented, unconnected, poorly 
integrated, and too often based on limited data, evaluation and review. Attempts at integration and 
coordination either get captured or become talking shops of limited value, with warring factions often at each 
others’ throats.  
While coming from very different standpoints on particular issues, there was however agreement among 
informants that the current situation was, as one put it, ‘a mess’. What, then, is the cause of this 
dysfunctionality, where both science and policy are negatively affected, and where a ‘One Health’ response 
looks a far-off dream? One informant argued, 'First, there’s a shrinking resource base. This breeds competition 
and secretiveness. Second, there’s no common language. They end up shouting at each other: one in Spanish, 
one in Italian! You need a common story to agree to. Currently there are just too many players.'116 Another 
argued, 'There has been lots of cash flowing. It keeps the vets in their jobs […] There has been cyclical pattern 
of crisis, control, repopulation, crisis, control and so on […]The problem is that it’s driven by vets and their pet 
solution. A solution at any cost.'117 Yet another pointed out. 'We are dealing with politics. All politicians want 
success within a single legislative period. But tsetse/tryps control is expensive and long-term.'118 
                                                          
114 Interview, researcher, Nairobi, 12 July 2013 
115 Interview, researcher, Vienna, 10 July 2013 
116 Interview, researcher, Washington DC, 12 July 2013 
117 Interview, researcher, Nairobi, 12 July 2013 
118 Interview, researcher, Vienna, 10 July 2013 
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5. Conclusion 
Each of the narratives outlined above carry with them particular visions of development, located in 
assumptions about what development is about, what future environments should look like, and what 
production systems are best. These in turn reflect perspectives on the appropriate role of the state and the 
market, the role of livestock keepers and professional experts, and whether the best route to addressing the 
disease is via the vector or via the parasite. Narratives compete in a highly contested policy space, in contexts 
where data on incidence and impact remains highly uncertain and where the models are often flawed and 
limiting. Field experiments, demonstration cases, success stories and economic models all help to justify 
interventions. These combine with political manoeuvring, competition over funds and much hype and rhetoric 
around particular claims and counter-claims. In the aid-driven world of funding, there is often little rigour and 
accountability, and national governments in Africa, being so dependent on external funds, are too often 
swayed by fashions and fads. With the debate captured by certain professional and bureaucratic interests 
those living with the disease, in poor and marginal areas, whether herders, hunters or gatherers, have little or 
no say in what priorities are decided upon. 
The story of tsetse and trypanosomiasis control in Africa over the last century is in sum a political story. It is 
often told in terms of scientific ‘facts’ or economic ‘models’, but it is one that is ultimately reflective of 
competing power, prestige, control and authority. As we have seen, the science is not dissociated from this; in 
fact it is deeply intertwined with such politics, and constructed with and by political processes that act to 
exclude and reinforce particular stances. As the paper shows, control options are driven by particular interests; 
they support careers, professional interests and institutional positions. Science and policy is inevitably 
dependent on the political and institutional setting. All research and intervention efforts are thus deeply 
political, and socially embedded in long histories that reflect how scientists and technicians see the world, both 
in terms of problems and solutions.  
In seeking a more constructive way forward, and getting over the unhelpful competition between control 
approaches, recognising, naming and addressing these political and institutional barriers is, I believe, 
important, if sometimes a bit awkward. If the rhetoric of a more integrated One Health approach is to be 
realised in practice, then there needs to be a  deeper reflexivity among both research and policy actors about 
the framing of issues, and the way this acts to construct particular narratives, and so guide interventions down 
particular pathways. An appreciation of the politics of science and policy, as attempted in this paper, will 
hopefully help recast the way tsetse and trypanosomiasis efforts are thought about and practised. And in so 
doing hopefully offer up alternative, possibly more effective, approaches that have to date been ignored and 
side-lined, as well as providing a firmer basis for collaboration across institutions and so realising the aims and 
ambitions of a One Health approach to which everyone subscribes. 
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